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Abstract: Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure 
objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say 
that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that 
this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de 
facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that 
belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in 
miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical 
position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence 
that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is 
assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point. 
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1. Introduction: The religious epistemology of Alvin 
Plantinga and the de facto/de jure dependence 
 
Among recent contributions to the epistemology of 
religion, one of the most influential is that of Alvin Plantinga. 
In the first two volumes of his trilogy,1 he discusses and 
proposes his “normative”, general epistemology, and in the 
last volume, Warranted Christian belief (2000), he applies this 
“normative” epistemology to religious epistemology in 
particular.2 
One of his main goals is to answer objections to the 
rationality of theism. In order to deal with them, Plantinga 
(2000, part 2) establishes that there are two sorts of 
objections against belief in God. The first is what he calls de 
facto objections, i. e., claims or arguments which aim at 
showing that belief in God is false. Perhaps the most famous 
de facto objection to theism is the problem of evil, in either its 
logical or evidential form.3 De facto objections are always a 
matter of truth: the proponent argues that belief in God 
cannot be considered knowledge because it is false, for God 
does not exist or his existence is at any rate very improbable. 
The merits of this objection depend only on questions 
regarding the truth of theism.4 
The second kind of objections to theism is what 
Plantinga calls de jure objections, whose aim is not to show 
that belief in God is not true (although the objector may 
think it is false), but to show that it is irrational or defective due 
to some other reason. There are, of course, many possible de 
 
1 Plantinga (1993a, 1993b). 
2 For more on this distinction, see Moon (2016), p. 885-886. 
3 See da Silva & Bertato (2019); da Silva (202 
4 See also Plantinga (2015), p. 7-8, for a shorter explanation of de 
facto objections. 
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jure objections. For instance, one may argue that people 
believe in God in order to deal with the discomfort of living 
in a painful world. However, a rational belief should be 
produced by a reliable truth-aimed mechanism or capacity, 
not by a comfort-aimed mechanism. Therefore, even if God 
exists, this belief cannot be rational, for the cognitive 
mechanism is not aimed at truth, but at psychological 
comfort instead.  
A paradigmatic de jure objection is the one Plantinga labels 
the “Freud-Marx Complaint”. Roughly, like the objection 
stated above, this objection claims that belief in God is not 
rational because the cognitive mechanisms that produce this 
belief suffer from some malfunction. Belief in God is either 
caused by social dysfunctions (as Marx argued), or by 
affective necessities that result in wish fulfillment or wishful 
thinking, projected as belief in God (as Freud defended). In 
any case, a de jure objection attacks the reliability of the 
formation of some belief in question. At a first glance, this 
kind of objection seems to be independent of the truth or 
falsity of the belief: the problem is that such belief is 
irrational or defective in some other sense. 
Using Plantinga’s terminology, we can state the de facto/de 
jure distinction as follows: while de facto objections claim that 
belief in God is not true, de jure objections affirm that belief 
in God is not warranted.5 Thus, in the light of this distinction, 
it seems, in principle, that these objections are completely 
independent. In fact, the questions they deal with are, in 
some sense, independent: a belief generally can meet the 
conditions for warrant and be false;6 on the other hand, a 
 
5 It is not possible to summarize Plantinga’s complete view on 
rationality and justification. See part I of Plantinga (2000) for 
further detail, or a shorter exposition in Plantinga (2015, p. 9-25). 
6 Plantinga explains the conditions a belief should meet to be 
warranted: “A belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief 
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belief can be true but, for some reason, not be warranted – 
for instance, if the person acquires a true belief by luck. We 
can now apply this to belief in God: one thing is truth, and 
another, quite distinct, is warrant. For instance, one might 
say: “I believe in God, but organized religion is a mess; 
religious leaders use people to get richer, and people that 
believe in God through these religions are foolish and 
irrational”. But is this distinction sustainable? Is the de jure 
objection really independent of the de facto question? 
According to Plantinga, the answer is no. As he argues in 
great detail, if belief in God is true, then it is probably 
warranted: for we can think of a model, a state of affairs that 
validates such implication. In the model, God created us to 
know him: we are created with a cognitive mechanism to 
form belief in God that functions properly, in the 
appropriate environment, and which aims at true belief in 
God.7 Furthermore, Plantinga argues, a similar situation 
holds for Christian belief: if Christian belief is true, then it is 
probably warranted.8 On the other hand, if belief in God is 
false, then it is probably not warranted: as God doesn’t exist, 
probably the mechanisms that form belief in God don’t 
function properly, or don’t aim at true belief. 
And this leads to a very pertinent result. Many de jure 
objections rely upon de facto objections: for the adequate 
formulation of de jure objections must assume that God does 
not exist in the first place ー for, if he exists, belief in God 
is probably warranted, and the objection fails.  
 
is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly 
(subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is 
appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design 
plan that is successfully aimed at truth.” (2000, p. 153) 
7 Plantinga (2000), chapter 6, especially p. 157-158. 
8 Op. cit., chapter 8. 
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Of course, there are many de jure objections that do not 
depend on de facto objections. Taking an example from 
Andrew Moon (2020), if a person forms a belief in God by 
shaking a Magic-8 ball, then her belief is vulnerable to a de 
jure objection, for the belief is not warranted even if God 
exists. Still, when it comes to belief in God, most de jure 
claims cannot be made without supposing, explicitly or 
implicitly, a de facto objection. As Moon explains on the 
Freudian objection to theism: 
 
“Plantinga responds that if God exists, then 
theistic belief is not the result of mere wishful 
thinking. It is ultimately produced by truth-
aimed, properly functioning, reliable 
mechanisms designed by God. So, Freud's 
objection is plausible only on the assumption 
that God does not exist. Hence, many de jure 
objections will fail without a successful de facto 
objection – an argument that God does not 
exist – which many de jure objectors do not 
have.” (2016, p. 882) 
  
In the following, I assume Plantinga’s religious 
epistemology and his useful de facto/de jure distinction to 
analyze the case for belief in miracles. Making use of 
Plantinga’s general strategy, I will argue that many objections 
to belief in miracles are, actually, de jure objections to certain 
Christian beliefs. I will argue, more exactly, that objections 
against the reliability of religious testimony (a de jure 
objection) are dependent on the assumption that belief in 
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2. Warrant and belief in miracles 
 
2.1 Miracles, the Skeptical Position, and a de jure objection against 
miracles 
 
Now we turn to an analysis of a specific kind of religious 
belief: belief in miracles. There are many possible positions 
on what miracles really are when it comes to scientific 
accounts (for example, concerning laws of nature or 
scientific explanations), but for the present purposes I’ll 
simply assume that miracles are recognizable deliberate divine 
interventions. I have two reasons for this position. The first, a 
more theological reason, is that miracles, in the biblical 
metanarrative, are always divine interventions in order to 
accomplish some features of God’s plan, either in favour of 
his people or in favour of some particular person; and these 
divine actions are always recognizable as signs of his power, 
wisdom and love.9 A second reason to assume this minimal 
definition is that, even if a better definition of miracles is 
possible, the intension of the concept of “miracle” will 
generally have “recognizable deliberate divine intervention” 
among its components, or terms analogous to these; so we 
can assume that miracles are, at least, recognizable divine 
interventions with some purpose. 
Indeed, this was the original sense of the word miracle: 




9 See, for instance, Acts 2:22 (NVI), in which Peter says that Jesus 
was accredited “by miracles, wonders and signs”, or “δυνάμεσιν καὶ 
τέρασιν καὶ σημείοις”, according to the NA28 Greek version. As 
Denis Alexander affirms, these three words in the original are 
related with the power by which God acts, the recognition by 
people, and sign of God’s operation (Alexander, 2017, p. 3). 
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“We might observe that the term is from the 
Latin miraculum, which is derived from mirari, to 
wonder; thus the most general characterization 
of a miracle is as an event that provokes 
wonder. As such, it must be in some way 
extraordinary, unusual, or contrary to our 
expectations. Disagreement arises, however, as 
to what makes a miracle something worth 
wondering about.” (Corner, 2005.) 
 
One of such disagreements is on the nature of miracles. 
Some argue that miracles necessarily involve violations of the 
laws of nature.10 As Corner affirms, though, both Augustine 
and Aquinas seem to hold the opinion that “a miracle is not 
contrary to nature, but only to our knowledge of nature”.11 
This debate is far from being settled. However, since the 
epistemic status of miracles is the feature that I want to focus 
on, we can, for the present purposes, be agnostic about their 
metaphysical structure.12 Thus, I assume that miracles are 
 
10 Either because they must be recognized as supernatural 
interventions or because they are, otherwise, impossible. 
11 Corner, op. cit. 
12 In fact, I’m not sure that miracles are necessarily violations of laws 
of nature. Even if we assume that all of the miracles (real deliberate 
divine interventions of some type) cannot be passive of some 
scientific explanation, it does not mean that they are always 
violations of laws of nature in the metaphysical sense. Assuming 
classical theism, as miracles should be recognized by believers and 
God is infinitely wise, we could think of God as acting sometimes 
in subtle ways within the laws he established, in order to 
communicate with his people. But perhaps I’m completely 
mistaken; be as it is, this footnote does not compromise my 
argumentation in this paper. 
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recognizable deliberate divine interventions, signs that can be 
recognized by persons as special divine actions with some 
purpose. Beginning from this minimal definition, we move 
now to the case for belief in miracles and warrant. 
In the history of philosophy, one of the main critics of 
the rationality of belief in miracles is David Hume. There is 
a lot of discussion about his views, and it would be quite 
impossible to deal with all the literature accumulated around 
Hume’s statements on miracles. However, in one of his 
famous passages on this topic, Hume remarkably casts doubt 
on the reliability of testimony for miracles, provided by 
testimonies; as he says: 
 
“Where shall we find such a number of 
circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration 
of one fact? And what have we to oppose to 
such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute 
impossibility or miraculous nature of the 
events, which they relate? And this surely, in 
the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be 
regarded as a sufficient refutation”. (Hume, 
op.cit., p. 124.)13 
 
But how should we interpret such objection? As Denis 
Alexander points out, Hume seems to think that the forming 
process of these beliefs is unreliable, due to many possible 
reasons: “witnesses to alleged miracles are all incompetent, 
or suffering from delusions, or are not beyond suspicion in 
some other way, so we cannot really trust them”.14 John 
Greco also explains Hume’s reasons to doubt testimony: 
 
13 The term “cloud of witnesses” is found in the Bible, in Hebrews 
12:1 (New International Version). 
14 Alexander (2017, p. 3). 
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Hume believes that the track record that leads testimonial 
evidence to its source is somehow corrupted. As Greco 
explains: 
 
“Sometimes people lie, or are self-deceived, or 
just make a mistake. In any case, the track 
record is not very good. And in light of that 
track record, the testimonial evidence for the 
present case is not very good either. But now 
all Hume’s premises are in place: Our 
testimonial evidence that an apparent miracle 
has occurred will never be as good as our 
evidence that it has not occurred. And this 
means we can never reasonably believe, on the 
basis of testimonial evidence, that a miracle 
really has occurred.” (Greco, 2018, p. 91.) 
 
Thus, Hume challenges the reliability of testimony for 
miracles, making testimony-based belief in miracles 
unwarranted. Belief in miracles is formed through cognitive 
mechanisms that are not working properly, and it does not 
matter whether Hume thinks miracles are possible or not. 
Also, it does not matter the evidence given by the testimony 
of people that witnessed some miraculous event; even if in 
principle what they saw was miraculous, we cannot trust their 
testimony, and thus, belief in miracles is always not 
warranted.15 
 
15 Some may affirm that there is a third option: Hume has in mind 
the classical/deontological notion of justification: persons are 
justified when they accomplish the duty of following the evidence, 
but the testimonies fail in doing so. However, I argue that even if 
they are justified in the classical sense (i.e., if they followed the 
evidence to their best), Hume would still maintain that their 
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 Such objection to the reliability of testimony can be 
somehow generalized: the statement that “belief in miracles 
is always not warranted” can be accepted not only by some 
humeans, but also by naturalists and other skeptics in 
general. I call this general thesis the “Skeptical Position” or 
SP: 
 
(SP)  Belief in miracles is necessarily not 
warranted.16 
 
Now, SP can be defended from different personal 
positions. Let us say that a person, called Skep, is a deist: he 
thinks that God does not intervene in reality. Another 
person, Tik, is a naturalist: she thinks there is no supernatural 
being as God. Skep and Tik have, indeed, very different 
beliefs about God; however, when it comes to the question 
of miracles, both agree that miracles are not possible, and 
both can accept SP consistently, although their arguments 
for SP and their degree of acceptance may differ. 
Another feature of this claim is that, regardless of 
arguments to maintain it, SP is the basis of a de jure objection, 
and not only to belief in miracles, but also to Christian belief. 
For Christians believe not only that deliberate divine 
interventions are possible, but they do believe that, in order 
to reveal himself, God has performed uncountable miracles 
throughout history.17 Christians believe, above all else, in one 
 
testimony cannot be trusted, and this indicates a de jure objection, 
according to Plantinga’s terminology. 
16 I recognize that beliefs in miracles come in many kinds. For a 
while, it is sufficient to see that, according to the definition given 
in this section, to believe in miracles is simply to believe in 
deliberate divine interventions. 
17 I will assume, despite criticisms, that there is such a thing as a 
“normative Christian belief”: a minimal commitment to Christian 
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miracle: the resurrection of Jesus, the Son of God, the most 
impressive, improbable, and astonishing miracle that could 
happen just considering the mere ordinary facts about 
human nature. If there is just one event we could call 
miraculous in the biblical metanarrative, this event is the 
resurrection of Jesus. However, a person who accepts SP has 
to think, on pain of contradiction, that this Christian belief 
in Jesus' resurrection is not warranted. Despite the historical 
evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, Skep and Tik will find 
some alternative explanation. They could say, for instance, 
that the apostles were mistaken; that their belief in the 
resurrection was formed through a mechanism that was not 
functioning properly, or was not aimed at true belief. In this 
way, SP is the central part of a de jure objection to beliefs in 
miracles, and as miracles are deliberate divine interventions, 
and Christian belief includes the actuality of such 
interventions, SP is the central part of a de jure objection to 
Christian belief as well. 
Now, one more thing should be considered in order to 
have a precise analysis. There are two contradictory 
possibilities: either miracles are possible or not. If they are 
possible, then belief in miracles can be true. If they are not 
possible, then any belief in miracles is always false. Thus, 
either belief in miracles can be true, or is always false. Let us 
analyze in detail these two possibilities regarding warrant. 
 
ecumenical orthodox standards, like belief in the Bible and in its 
interpretations as expressed the ecumenical creeds - the “catholic 
faith” common to all of the major traditions in Christianity.  
Also, despite historical biblical criticism, most Christians maintain 
that most miracles in the Bible are real, of even all of them. As I 
assume Plantinga’s epistemology as a background, I suggest the 
interested reader to see Plantinga (2000), p. 303-341, in which the 
philosopher deals with potential defeaters that may come from 
recent Bible scholarship. 
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2.2 Analysing the possibilities 
 
Inspired by Plantinga’s model given in section 1 and by 
Stephen Wykstra (2002, 2019), let us think about the 
following state of affairs which validates the proposition “if 
a Christian belief in miracles is true, then it is probably 
warranted”. In Christian belief, so the model goes, God has 
created us to know him, so in principle, we are able to have 
knowledge of God (through sensus divinitatis, or some other 
natural cognitive mechanism18). Some of the ways to activate 
such mechanisms is through miracles; for instance, those 
found in the Scriptures, and particularly, the miracle of the 
resurrection of Jesus. When Christians recognize such 
miracles, they form beliefs through their cognitive apparatus. 
For instance, they believe in the testimony of the Scriptures 
and of the Church that Jesus resurrected;19 then, Christians 
think: “Christ died for my sins, and then rose again. That is 
true”. But if this is the case, then a belief in miracles can meet 
the conditions for warrant, described in section 1. Therefore, 
if a Christian belief in miracles is true, then it is probably 
warranted. 
In this model, miracles are actual, so they are at least 
possible. But many beliefs a Christian may form on supposed 
miracles can be misguided. A Christian may form her belief 
in a supposed miracle through arbitrary ways - for instance, 
she may open YouTube, digit “miracle”, watch the first 
 
18 There is a debate on the empirical evidence of such a module as 
a sensus divinitatis, the faculty responsible for the knowledge of God. 
Some argue that, even if there is no such module, other faculties, 
individually or jointly, can function such that knowledge of God 
may obtain. Moon (2016, p. 883-884) provides an outline of this 
debate. 
19 As Stephen Wykstra holds, testimony reliability is relevant for 
warranted belief in the resurrection. See Wykstra (2002, 2019). 
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video that appears relating a false miracle, and believe in such 
a supposed miracle. Even in the case in which the miracle is 
true, her belief would not be warranted; isn’t this a problem? 
I don’t think so. The fact that some beliefs in miracles are 
false does not mean that Christians are necessarily credulous; 
moreover, even if some believer is credulous, for instance, 
believing in miracles like the person who believes in God on 
the basis of a Magic-8 ball or by watching a supposed miracle 
on YouTube, such cases do not touch our subject. For, in 
this model, if there are actual miracles, this only means that 
there are actual states of affairs in which God wants to be 
known. In such cases, he acts through miracles that signalize 
his specific communication, in such a way that the belief-
forming systems of believers are attuned; thus, when 
believers see those miracles (actual deliberate divine 
interventions), their beliefs in such miracles are warranted. 
Therefore, in the given model, if a Christian belief in miracles 
is true, then it is probably warranted. And if some beliefs in 
miracles are warranted true beliefs, persons can recognize 
and know these miracles as deliberate divine interventions. 
Let us now consider the other possibility: belief in 
miracles is false – in this case, necessarily false: there is no 
such a thing as a miracle. Plantinga has shown that, if the 
Christian belief in God is false, then it is probably not 
warranted, and I think that the same reasoning applies to 
belief in miracles. If all beliefs in miracles are false, we should 
agree with SP: belief in miracles is not warranted. For 
instance, in the case of the resurrection, the disciples could 
have desired to see their Master so heartfully, due to the 
impact of walking with Jesus for such a long time, and the 
events that Christians always remember in Maundy 
Thursdays and Good Fridays were so intense and traumatic, 
that their cognitive faculties were not functioning properly, 
or not aiming at true beliefs; for short, their belief in the 
resurrection was not warranted. And if their belief in the 
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resurrection was not warranted, then the same is true of 
other beliefs Christians hold.20 
 
 
2.4 De facto and de jure dependence regarding miracles 
 
But here we reach a relevant point. In the model 
provided, objections to miracles are objections to Christian 
belief. As I have said in the first section, Plantinga considers 
that the de facto objection is not independent of the de jure 
objection in Freud-Marx’s case. There is some dependence 
between warrant and truth: to say that Christian belief is not 
warranted, one must suppose (sometimes implicitly) that 
Christian belief is false. As he says: 
 
“This dependence of the question of warrant 
or rationality on the truth or falsehood of 
theism leads to a very interesting conclusion. If 
the warrant enjoyed by belief in God is related 
in this way to the truth of that belief, then the 
question whether theistic belief has warrant is 
not after all independent of the question 
whether theistic belief is true. So the de jure 
question we have finally found is not, after all, 
really independent of the de facto question; to 
answer the former we must answer the 
latter.”21 
 
And here we have a similar situation: to affirm that 
Christian belief in miracles is necessarily not warranted, one 
 
20 As Paul the Apostle says, “if Christ has not been raised, your 
faith is futile” (1 Corinthians 15:17a, NIV).  
21 Plantinga, A. (2015), p. 41 (emphasis in the original). 
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must suppose that Christian belief in miracles is necessarily 
not true; thus, belief in miracles is necessarily not warranted 
if, and only if, belief in miracles is necessarily false. On the 
one hand, as I said, some beliefs in miracles may still be not 
warranted; on the other, when it comes to SP, things are 
different: the SP claims that belief in miracles is necessarily not 
warranted. However, SP cannot be supported without 
supposing, in the first place, that belief in miracles is 
necessarily false (for if a certain Christian belief in miracles is 
true, then it is probably warranted). Therefore, a de jure 
objection concerning miracles that is based on SP is not 
independent of the de facto objection on the truth of 
recognizable deliberate divine interventions. 
But some might say here: why should we be surprised? 
Whatever applies to Christian belief, applies to belief in 
deliberate divine interventions as well. However, our focus 
here is another: SP, an allegation about the warrant of belief 
in miracles, puts forward an epistemological question. 
However, in order to argue successfully for SP, Skep, Tik, or 
another skeptic, cannot just rely upon epistemological 
claims: they must go on and embrace a metaphysical or 
theological assumption. For all that has been argued, it seems 
that what really grounds a de jure objection or a debunking 
argument regarding miracles are the metaphysical or 
theological grounds regarding the possibility of the truth of 
belief in miracles. In other terms, de jure objections to belief 
in miracles are not religiously neutral; they are grounded on 
metaphysical or theological assumptions.22 
Now, someone that endorses SP may still affirm that 
miracles are impossible. But to show that they are, I suggest 
that a SP-defender should choose one of these options: 
 
22 Or, as Plantinga says, “the metaphysical or ultimately religious 
roots of the question concerning the rationality or warrant or lack 
thereof for belief in God” (op. cit., p. 40).  
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either she assumes her commitment to an atheological or 
areligious assumption, and this implicitly is also an admission 
that a Christian belief in miracles can be warranted; or she 
must appeal to evidences for the assumptions that miracles 
are impossible. But it seems to be really hard to show that all 
of the supposed instances of miracles are false, in order to 
hold that belief in miracles is necessarily not warranted. 
From a Christian standpoint, however, things are much 
less “dramatic”. A Christian does not aim at and does not 
need to believe that every supposed miracle is true, and does 
not need to be credulous. Belief in recognizable deliberate 
divine intervention can be properly basic and even warranted 
for her, and may be accepted regardless of arguments for or 
against miracles. On the other hand, if an evidentialist 
challenges her position, it is easier to argue for her position 
than for a person which holds SP: to show that miracles are 
possible, only one miracle is needed. 
 
 
3. Final remarks 
 
In this paper, I assumed Plantinga’s religious 
epistemology and the de facto/de jure distinction to argue that, 
to show that belief in miracles are not warranted, one must 
suppose in principle that belief in miracles is always false. 
The Skeptical Position or SP, according to which belief in 
miracles is not warranted, is committed to the allegation that 
miracles are impossible, and that is clearly harder than 
showing that just some beliefs in miracles are not warranted. 
So, a person who holds SP must choose one of the following 
strategies: either find evidence that all of the supposed 
miracles are false, which is quite difficult, or admit one’s 
commitment to an areligious position regarding God. On 
this framework, a Christian is in a better position when it 
comes to miracles. 
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Of course, this argument holds only if we assume both 
Plantinga’s general and religious epistemology, and if his de 
facto/de jure distinction also holds. If the argument is sound, 
however, perhaps the best thing a SP-defender could do is 
to accept some sort of anti-evidentialist position analogous 
to that of Plantinga; for if she gives herself the burden of 
proving that all of the miracles are false, the problem of 
induction may become a trap, and a miracle with so much 
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23 See, for example, Nicholas T. Wright (2003), in which he collects 
historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, and argues that 
one can just avoid the total evidence by holding a naturalist 
position. Wright’s argument has some resonance with the position 
defended here. See also Swinburne (2003) for a more philosophical 
account. 
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